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## PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN

(Supplement to PSB D-21 dated October 9, 1952)

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by AUTHORITY OF [redacted]  
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

This Plan was approved by the Board at its Seventeenth Meeting, January 15, 1953. The Director was authorized to coordinate any further comments which the PSB member-agencies might wish to make. This t25X1A represents such final coordination.

  
Secretary to the Board

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A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

with respect to

BERLIN

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## SECTION I

### PROBLEM

To formulate a national psychological strategy with respect to Berlin.

## SECTION II

### APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES

As set forth in NSC 132/1.

## SECTION III

### A. Summary and Analysis

1. The city of Berlin is divided between the Western Sectors governed by a pro-Western city government working closely with the U.S., British, and French authorities, and the Eastern Sector, completely dominated by the Soviets and their German puppets.

2. As one of the free world's most exposed outposts, vulnerable to Soviet harassments of many kinds, and posing a constant challenge to

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Soviet efforts to consolidate their position and prestige in Eastern Germany, Berlin will continue to be a focal point of pressures and counterpressures.

3. While ideally any planning for Berlin should take into account Soviet capabilities and intentions with respect to Berlin, both of these and particularly the latter, can be estimated only in general terms. As to the former, the Soviets are capable of making the Western Allies' position in Berlin untenable, either by the use of force or by restricting Western access to the city. A major assumption regarding Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin is that the Soviets will not deliberately provoke, or run a major risk of, war for the sake of Berlin. More tentatively, it is believed the Soviets will not impose another full blockade in view of: a) the failure of the last blockade, b) international political reactions obstructing broader Soviet aims, and c) a Soviet realization that such a course would stimulate western military programs and increase the danger of armed conflict. It is further assumed that the Soviets intend to make Berlin the capital of the German Democratic Republic, and eventually of a reunited, Soviet-dominated Germany as a major step in strengthening the Soviet sphere, if they can do so without incurring grave risk of war.

4. Present Soviet efforts with respect to Berlin may be designed either to put the Western Allies under pressure or to strengthen the Soviet position in the East Zone. Current harassments, such as barring Allied highway patrols and interfering with transportation, appear to be designed to probe Allied firmness and unity of purpose, and to undermine Allied prestige as well as to threaten our right of access.

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5. The present paper identifies general policy objectives and proposes a strategy adaptable to the following contingencies:
- a. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded;
  - b. Serious harassing measures short of a full blockade are employed;
  - c. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade are imposed;
  - d. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable;
  - e. A Soviet or satellite attack on the Western forces in Berlin occurs.

B. West Berlin's situation. It is now estimated that West Berlin will continue to be:

1. useful as a base behind the Iron Curtain for propaganda, intelligence, and other activities;
2. a symbol of Western strength and determination in the face of Soviet harassment and threat of aggressive tactics;
3. a symbol to the Germans -- East and West -- of the hope for the eventual re-unification of Germany in freedom;
4. vulnerable to, and subjected to, a continued Soviet and East German campaign of encroachment and harassment which could have dangerous effects on the city's economic viability and morale, as well as discouraging and possibly divisive effects on the three Allied Powers, the German Federal Republic, and the West Berlin authorities;
5. subject (despite being strongly pro-Western) to a certain amount of inter- and intra-party discord, special social problems, and

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occasional irritation with the Federal Republic and the Western Allies  
due in part to uncertainty concerning Berlin's future;

6. in need of continued subsidization of its economy and moral  
support by the Western Allies and the Federal Republic; and

7. required by circumstances to have a special status, separate from  
the Federal Republic, and denied the degree of self-government which the  
Federal Republic is to have under the Contractual Agreements. (Despite  
this, ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic will continue to  
be strengthened and West Berlin will in practice be given even more free-  
dom of action by the U.S., French, and U.K. authorities.)

#### SECTION IV

##### OBJECTIVE

To maintain and reinforce our political, military, cultural, and  
psychological position in the Western Sectors of Berlin, and to exploit  
that position in the furtherance of U.S. national interests.

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SECTION V

TASKS

(NOTE: Tasks and the Objective in Section IV above supersede the Objective (Page 7 B, Para. 2, Concerning West Berlin) and Tasks (Page 9, Para. 2, Concerning Berlin) outlined in PSB D-21. The implementation of Tasks and Courses of Action under Contingencies B through E may be subject to modification in the light of specific policy decisions made at the time such contingencies arise.

Contingency A. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded.

Task One: To maintain and reinforce the U.S., U.K., and French position in the Western Sectors of Berlin and to buttress the morale of West Berlin.

1. Utilize all appropriate measures to encourage and support among the Governments and peoples of the free world, especially in the Federal Republic and the remainder of Western Europe, diplomatic and other actions intended to foster continued interest in and a sense of responsibility for West Berlin. 25X1A

Action: STATE [REDACTED]

Support: DEFENSE

2. Convince the West Berlin people that their own determination and faith are power factors affecting the whole struggle between the Soviet complex and the Western democracies. 25X1A

Action: STATE [REDACTED]

Support: DEFENSE

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3. Assure the West Berlin authorities and population of the continued support of the free world by such actions as:  
(a) official statements, (b) exchange of prominent personalities between Berlin and the West, (c) international distinction awards to the peoples of the city, etc.

Action: STATE 25X1A

Support: DEFENSE [REDACTED]

4. Provide a counterbalance in West Berlin to the ill-effects of Soviet economic warfare against Berlin, especially so as to maintain and improve, by international action where possible, the standards-of-living in West Berlin.

Action: MSA 25X1A

Support: STATE, DEFENSE, [REDACTED]

5. Publicize Allied and Federal Republic aid measures and readiness to defend the city by informing the population of West Berlin of the measures taken in their behalf, and by giving ample recognition to their own achievements in restoring and maintaining their city.

Action: STATE [REDACTED] 25X1A

Support: DEFENSE

Task Two: To deter and neutralize Soviet or Soviet-inspired harassing tactics.

1. Convey to the Soviets, U.S. and Allied determination to remain in Berlin regardless of the consequences, thereby

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giving evidence of Western unity regarding the  
Western position in the city.

Action: STATE [REDACTED] 25X1A

Support: DEFENSE

2. Demonstrate, jointly with the French, British, and Germans, where appropriate, the futility of and grave risks associated with any Soviet tactics calculated to cause an Allied withdrawal from Berlin.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE [REDACTED] 25X1A

3. Make clear to all the world that the Western powers will hold the Soviet Union responsible for any communist actions against the Western position in Berlin.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, [REDACTED] 25X1A

4. Intensify Soviet doubts as to the reliability of the GDR authorities, military forces, and population.

Action: STATE [REDACTED] 25X1A

5. As may be specifically authorized by Washington, develop and discreetly publicize, within the limitations of security, Allied capabilities for retaliation against possible Soviet harassment measures. This should be accomplished jointly with the U.K., and French authorities where possible.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, [REDACTED]

Support: MSA

6. Mobilize free-world public opinion, especially in Western Europe, to confront the Soviet Union with a

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consolidated opposition to aggressive Soviet tactics  
against Berlin which endanger world peace, and to support  
measures exposing Soviet actions.

Action: STATE [REDACTED] 25X1A

Support: DEFENSE

7. Develop and exploit by all available means political,  
military, economic, and/or psychological programs of free-  
world support for West Berlin, especially those under-  
taken in consonance with existing collective security  
agreements.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, [REDACTED] 25X1A

Support: MSA

Task Three: To utilize West Berlin as a means of strengthening the  
morale of the free-world and its determination to re-  
sist Soviet pressures and possible aggression.

1. Exploit to the fullest, by all available means,  
Western response to Berlin's situation as evidence of  
Western strength, determination, and unity of purpose,  
and as a demonstration of the principle of collective  
security in action. 25X1A

Action: STATE [REDACTED]

Support: DEFENSE and MSA

2. Communicate to other parts of the free world evidences  
of the resilience, courage, optimism, and anti-com-  
munist sentiment of the people of Berlin. 25X1C

Action: STATE [REDACTED]

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3. Prepare for publication, jointly with the British and French if advisable, a White Paper, or such diplomatic communications as may be deemed appropriate, designed to contrast the peaceful aims of Allied actions with respect to Berlin with the unwarranted and hostile actions of the USSR.

Action: STATE

Contingency B. Serious harassment short of a full blockade.

Task: To consolidate the Western position in Berlin in the face of increased Soviet pressures.

1. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contingency A.

Action: As Stated

Support: As Stated

2. Make evident the Allies' preparedness to cope with a new blockade, including their potential for retaliation and/or circumvention.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and MSA  
25X1C

3. Utilize the crisis in West Berlin to accelerate and intensify Western defense efforts and to strengthen Western unity, with particular reference to the EDC and Atlantic Community concepts.

25X1C

Action: STATE, DEFENSE [REDACTED]

Support: MSA

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5. Display to the West German and West Berlin populations Allied military preparedness to resist any maneuvers by the Soviet or East German military or para-military organizations which would indicate that force is to be applied to expel the Allies from Berlin.

25X1C Action: STATE and DEFENSE

25X1A

Contingency C. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade, are imposed.

Task: To gain international recognition of the Berlin situation of the aggressive nature of Soviet actions.

1. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contingencies A and B.

Action: As Stated

Support: As Stated

2. Stimulate support among member nations of the UN to consider the "Berlin question" in that body, with particular reference to the USSR's aggressive intentions.

Action: STATE

25X1C

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3. Exploit by all available means throughout the free world any joint approach by the U.S., British, and French diplomatic representatives in Moscow to the appropriate Soviet authorities concerning the severity of the situation in Berlin.

25X1C

Action: STATE [REDACTED]

Support: DEFENSE

4. Apply and exploit by all available means such retaliation and circumvention measures as were planned under Contingency B.

25X1C

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, [REDACTED] and MSA

Contingency D. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable.

Task: To lay the psychological groundwork for the possible use of Allied military force in Berlin.

1. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contingencies A, B, and C.

Action: As Stated

Support: As Stated

2. By agreement with British and French authorities, publish an appropriate diplomatic communication.

Action: STATE

3. Stimulate free-world support for any ultimatum to the USSR, which the U.S. and its Allies will deliver in opposition to Soviet aggression.

25X1C

Action: STATE, DEFENSE [REDACTED]

4. Employ all available psychological means to make clear to the world that we are determined to prevent out-

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break of general war, and that whatever Western action  
may be taken in Berlin is to defend Berlin against  
Soviet aggression. 25X1C

Action: STATE, DEFENSE [REDACTED]

Contingency E. A Soviet attack on western forces in Berlin.

Task: To secure the support of all our Allies (including our  
friends in East Germany) for the Allied policy of armed  
resistance to Soviet aggression.

1. Intensify our efforts showing the USSR as responsible for  
precipitating hostilities which, if not checked, will  
develop into general war. 25X1C

Action: STATE, DEFENSE [REDACTED]

2. Stimulate active support among member nations of NATO  
and the UN for Allied efforts to resist Soviet aggression.

25X1C

Action: STATE, DEFENSE [REDACTED]

SECTION VI

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

The administrative provisions outlined in Section VI of PSB D-21,  
dated October 9, 1952, will prevail for the implementation of this  
strategy.

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